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McKAY, Circuit Judge. 
 
         Appellants Edward and Deborah LeJeune appeal from the district 
court's 
grant of summary judgment for the Appellees Bliss-Salem, Inc. and General 
Electric Co.  
The LeJeunes brought this negligence and strict products liability action 
against 
Appellees when Mr. Lejeune was injured while working on a piece of 
machinery 
Appellees had repaired.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 
district court. 
 
                                I. 
         Mr. LeJeune, a Pennsylvania resident, worked at a Delaware steel 
mill as an 
"oiler" or "lube man."  As such, he was responsible for checking the oil 
and lubrication of 
various machines.  Mr. LeJeune's accident occurred on a piece of machinery 
known as a 
"table."  Tables consist of a frame which holds large steel cylinders 
weighing two to five 
tons each.  The cylinders, powered by motors, are rotated in order to 
transport hot steel 
slabs from one processing machine to another.  Gaps, approximately two 
inches in width, 
exist between cylinders.  Mr. LeJeune, believing a certain table was 
deactivated, jumped 
on top of the cylinders in order to do his maintenance work.  The 
cylinders were 
activated, and, as they began to roll, Mr. LeJeune was caught in the gap 
between them.  
His injuries were serious and extensive. 
         Appellees' involvement with the steel mill began when CitiSteel, 
the owner 
of the mill, hired Appellees in 1988 to refurbish the steel mill 
machinery.  The mill had 
been shut down for two years and had deteriorated into a serious state of 
disrepair.  
General Electric employees were on-site for eight months repairing 
equipment.  Some 
refurbishing work took place at a General Electric shop in Pennsylvania.  
Bliss-Salem 
performed most of its refurbishing work at its Ohio plant.  Appellees 
finished their work 
at the steel mill approximately three years before Mr. LeJeune's accident 
occurred. 
         Basing their claim on tort theories of negligence and strict 
products liability, 
Appellants argue that the contracts between CitiSteel and Appellees 
created a duty 
requiring Appellees to redesign the steel mill equipment, eliminating any 
safety problems.  
They argue that this duty included a duty to warn of any hazards inherent 
in the 
machinery.  Appellees argue that the contracts simply required them to put 
the mill 
machinery back into working order and that any duty on their part did not 
extend to 
reevaluating the safety aspects of the various machinery involved. 
 
                               II. 
         Before we address the tort issues in this case, we must first 
decide which 
state's law applies.  In choosing which law applies, a federal court 
sitting in diversity 
must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.  Klaxon v. Stentor 
Electric Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Shuder v. McDonald's Corp., 859 F.2d 266, 
269 (3d Cir. 
1988).  Appellants brought this action in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  Thus, we must apply Pennsylvania's choice-of-
law rules. 
         Pennsylvania choice-of-law analysis consists of two parts.  
First, the court 
must look to see whether a false conflict exists.  Then, if there is no 
false conflict, the 
court determines which state has the greater interest in the application 
of its law.  SeeCipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 565 (1970); Lacey v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 
170, 187 & n.15 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules 
for purposes 
of forum non conveniens analysis).  A false conflict exists where "only 
one jurisdiction's 
governmental interests would be impaired by the application of the other 
jurisdiction's 
law."  Lacey, 932 F.2d at 187.  Here, no false conflict exists.  
Pennsylvania law 
recognizes strict products liability to protect its citizens from 
defective products and to 
encourage manufacturers to produce safe products.  Delaware law, however, 
does not 
recognize strict products liability based on the rationale that such 
claims are preempted by 
the Uniform Commercial Code.  Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Maryland, Inc., 
418 A.2d 968 
(Del. 1980).  Applying Delaware law would impair Pennsylvania's interest 
in protecting 
its citizen, Mr. LeJeune. 
         On the other hand, Delaware's interests would be impaired if 
Pennsylvania 
law were applied.  Delaware has an interest in prescribing the rules 
governing torts 
occurring nonfortuitously within its borders.  Under Pennsylvania choice 
of law analysis, 
a false conflict exists "where the accident is fortuitous and the state 
where the accident 
occurred has no interest in the regulatory standard at issue."  Reyno v. 
Piper Aircraft Co., 
630 F.2d 149, 170 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 235 
(1981); accordKuchinic v. McGrory, 422 Pa. 620, 624 (1966) (holding that 
false conflict existed 
because Georgia had no recognizable interest when accident's occurrence in 
that state was 
wholly fortuitous). 
         Here the occurrence of the accident in Delaware was not 
fortuitous.  
Delaware was the site of the accident (as well as the place where much of 
the alleged 
negligent conduct took place) because of the steel mill's fixed location 
in that state.  If 
Pennsylvania law were applied, Delaware's interest in regulating 
purposeful economic 
activity within its borders would be impaired.  We cannot agree with 
Appellants' assertion 
that Delaware has no interest in this case simply because Appellees have 
limited contacts 
with that state.  A state's interest in enforcing its tort law is not 
constrained to protecting 
residents from harm or suit.  See Schmidt v. Duo-Fast, Inc., No. 94-6541, 
1995 WL 
422681, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 1995) (holding that New Jersey law 
applied when New 
Jersey was the nonfortuitous site of accident even though defendant, which 
benefited 
from New Jersey law, was Illinois corporation).  A state could have a host 
of reasons for 
limiting liability, including encouraging economic activity in the state 
(such as the 
rebuilding of the steel mill), and lowering costs to consumers (such as 
CitiSteel).  Also 
without merit is Appellants' argument that, because Delaware's rejection 
of strict liability 
is based on its minority view that the Uniform Commercial Code preempts 
such a claim, 
its rejection of strict liability reflects no policy choice by the state.  
Delaware's decision to 
adopt and maintain the Uniform Commercial Code in light of this 
interpretation is 
obviously a policy choice.  Thus, a false conflict does not exist in this 
case. 
         We must next examine which state has a greater interest in having 
its law 
applied.  In making this determination, we look 
         to see what contacts each state has with the accident, the 
         contacts being relevant only if they relate to the "policies and 
         interest underlying the particular issue before the court."  
         When doing this it must be remembered that a mere counting 
         of contacts is not what is involved.  The weight of a particular 
         state's contacts must be measured on a qualitative rather than 
         quantitative scale. 
 
Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 566 (1970) (citations omitted).  In this 
case, 
Pennsylvania's only contact with the accident is the fact that Mr. LeJeune 
is a 
Pennsylvania resident and that a small portion of General Electric's work 
took place at a 
shop in Pennsylvania.  The Delaware contacts, however, are more 
substantial.  The 
accident occurred in Delaware, and most of the alleged negligent conduct 
took place there 
as well.  Additionally, as pointed out before, the accident's occurrence 
in Delaware was 
not fortuitous.  Where the site of an accident is not fortuitous, "the 
place of injury 
assumes much greater importance, and in some instances may be 
determinative."  Shields 
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 810 F.2d 397, 401 (3d Cir. 1987); Shuder v. 
McDonald's 
Corp., 859 F.2d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 1988).  Looking at these contacts 
qualitatively, we 
believe that Delaware has the greater interest in having its law applied.  
Delaware's 
contacts with the accident relate to substantive aspects of the case such 
as how and why 
certain conduct occurred.  Pennsylvania's contact arises not from 
substantive matters in 
the litigation but rather from Mr. LeJeune's residence.  Thus, we hold 
that Delaware law 
applies to this case. 
 
                               III. 
         Applying Delaware law, we can immediately dispose of Appellants' 
product liability claim.  Appellants' claim fails because Delaware does 
not recognize 
strict products liability.  Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Maryland, Inc., 418 
A.2d 968 (Del. 
1980).  Thus, we proceed to consider Appellants' remaining claim of 
negligence.  
Essentially, the parties dispute whether Appellees owed any duty to Mr. 
LeJeune.  
Appellants propose several theories under which a duty would arise in this 
case.  They 
argue that a duty was created by the contracts between the steel mill 
owner and 
Appellees, by the foreseeability of harm, and by public policy.  
Appellants also argue that 
a duty was created under Restatement Second of Torts  404.  Because these 
theories of 
liability are all predicated on a duty, and because the only way the 
Appellees could have 
created a duty in this case is through contract, we believe that a 
discussion of duty under 
section 404 will dispose of all the claims brought by Appellants.  Where, 
as here, a 
contract is unambiguous, it is appropriate for the court to determine its 
meaning as a 
matter of law at the summary judgment stage.  See Pellaton v. Bank of New 
York, 592 
A.2d 473, 478 (Del. 1991).  
         Before addressing section 404, we point out that the Delaware 
Supreme 
Court has never addressed the applicability of this particular section of 
the Restatement 
Second of Torts.  We do not need to decide, however, whether the court 
would adopt the 
section because, even assuming that it would, we do not believe it creates 
a duty in this 
case.  Section 404 provides: 
         One who as an independent contractor negligently makes, 
         rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another is subject to the same 
         liability as that imposed upon negligent manufacturers of 
         chattels. 
 
Although this language sweeps broadly, it does not impose liability on an 
independent 
contractor for work which the independent contractor did not undertake to 
perform.  Seesection 404 Comment a (independent contractor required to do 
competently everything 
"which he undertakes . . . .").  Rather, it is the scope of the 
undertaking, as defined in the 
contract, which gives shape to the independent contractor's duty in tort. 
         Appellants argue that the contracts entered into by Appellees 
required them 
either to warn of safety defects in the machinery or to redesign the 
machinery in such a 
way as to eliminate potential hazards.  Appellants point to broad language 
in the contracts 
such as "General Electric will check the delineated apparatus, analyze, 
and report 
findings" and "[w]hereas [CitiSteel] desires to refurbish and revamp the 
equipment . . . 
and [Bliss-Salem] is qualified and willing to do the work as specified . . 
. ."  App., Vol. II, 
at 583 (General Electric contract); id. at 628 (Bliss-Salem contract).  In 
particular, 
Appellants make much of the term "revamp" in the contract.  Because 
Webster's 
Unabridged Dictionary defines that term as "to renovate, redo, or revise," 
they argue, 
Appellees assumed a duty to redesign defective parts of the plate mill.  
However, not only 
does "renovate, redo, or revise" not necessarily mean "redesign," our 
version of Webster'slists "to put in repair" as the first definition of 
"revamp."  This definition is entirely 
consistent with Appellees defense:  that their undertaking was limited to 
"repairing" the 
mill.  In any event, the contract simply states, as a preamble, that 
Appellant "desires to 
refurbish and revamp the equipment."   The scope of work that Appellee (as 
opposed to 
Appellant) agreed to undertake (as opposed to merely desired) is described 
later in Article 
I. 
         The contracts contain, moreover, much more specific language 
indicating 
that Appellees were hired to do repair work only.  Each contract fills 
several pages with 
detailed descriptions of repair work for each machine.  For example, the 
General Electric 
contract provides the following "scope" for repair of a water pump: 
         External aluminum oxide blast clean. 
         Disassemble, clean & visual plus dimensional     inspection. * 
         Assemble (new bearings, gaskets, "O" rings, bolts). 
         Report. 
 
App., Vol. II, at 589 (General Electric contract).  The Bliss-Salem 
contract is full of 
similar language.  Appellants do not point us to any language in the 
contracts which 
specifically required Appellees to redesign a machine or to warn of safety 
defects.  
Although the Bliss-Salem contract does contain a few provisions which call 
for the 
redesign of particular machine parts, Appellants have failed to alert the 
court to any 
provisions which required the redesign of the machinery involved in Mr. 
LeJeune's 
accident.  No language in either contract specifically addresses the 
safety aspects of any 
piece of machinery.  Thus, it is clear from reading the contracts that 
Appellees undertook 
to repair rather than redesign the steel mill machinery. 
         Appellants also attempt to show that Appellees undertook to do 
more than 
simple repair work by citing to the following deposition excerpt of Mr. 
Hearn, a CitiSteel 
official: 
         Q.   Now let me ask you if the original specification was 
         deficient, would you expect the contractor to tell you that? 
          . . . . 
 
         A.   Yes.  If there was something deficient about a piece of 
         equipment, I would expect somebody to tell me.  I'm not an 
         engineer myself.  And if we sent a piece of equipment out to 
         Bliss or GE was here and they saw something and said, "Joe, 
         this is not designed correctly, we recommend you don't do 
         this," fine, I listen. 
 
App., Vol. I, at 176 (Hearn deposition excerpt).  This statement is at 
best ambiguous 
concerning Appellees' supposed duty to redesign and warn about safety 
aspects of the 
machinery.  In fact, Mr. Hearn also stated in his deposition that 
Appellees were not 
required to evaluate safety procedures and were only required to bring 
machinery back to 
its original working order.  Id. at 172-73.  Even were we to construe Mr. 
Hearn's 
statement as Appellants' wish, it would be clearly contradicted by the 
clear intent of the 
parties as expressed in the contracts themselves.  Mr. Hearn's statement 
does not change 
the fact that the contracts did not require Appellees to concern 
themselves with safety 
design.  Due to the limited nature of the contractual undertaking in this 
case, no duty in 
tort arose on the part of Appellees to redesign safety features of the 
equipment or to warn 
of potential hazards. 
         Even where the scope of an independent contractor's undertaking 
does not 
give rise to liability for design problems in a product, a duty may still 
arise if the product 
is "so obviously bad that a competent contractor would realize that there 
was a grave 
chance that his product would be dangerously unsafe."  Section 404 comment 
a.  
Appellants argue that General Electric was aware of the safety problems 
inherent in the 
machinery they were fixing.  They point to the fact that an accident 
similar to Mr. 
LeJeune's almost occurred while General Electric employees were testing 
equipment.  
General Electric averted an accident by simply looking to see if anyone 
was on the 
equipment before energizing it.  We do not believe that this single 
incident, in which no 
accident occurred, was so "obviously bad" that it would give rise to a 
duty not 
contemplated in the original contract. 
         The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
                    _______________________ 
